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Walter Heller has remarked that:^
Economics has come of age in the 1960 's. Two Presidents
have recognized and drawn on modern economics as a source of
national strength and Presidential power. Their willingness
to use, for the first time, the full range of modern economic
tools underlies the unbroken U.S. expansion since early 1961
—an expansion that in its first five years created over
seven million new jobs, doubled profits, increased the nation's
real output by a third, and olosed the $50 billion gap between
actual and potential production that plagued the American
economy in 1961.
Heller's expression, modern economics, also desoribed as "new
economics," is derived from the writings of John Maynard Keynes.
Keynes' theory is basically a compromise to the socialist doctrine
that proscribed complete governmental control of the eoonomy and the
classical, laissez faire concept of private economy. His theory pro-
vided for direct governmental aid while maintaining private ownership
of the economy.
The concept of "modern" eoonomios is a misnomer as far as his-
torical derivation is concerned, but in terms of political practice
Heller's use of the phrase is correct. As Heller has indicated, the
idea of the Federal government as an active participant in the economy
Walter W. Heller, New Dimensions of Political Economy (New
York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1967), p. 1.
*\Tohn Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment. Interest
and Money (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1936).

2—participation that seeks real growth and stabilization of the
economy --commenced with the Kennedy Administration in 1961.
One aspect of this new approach to political economics is the
concept of fiscal activism. Prior to the 1960*s, Federal fiscal policy
was determined by the matching of governmental expenditures with reve-
nues. The impact of the level of expenditures and revenues on the
economy was not a prerequisite for a particular fiscal policy. In-
stead, fiscal policy was a measure of the financial worth of the
government. An active fiscal policy, however, is one that is formu-
lated because of its impact on the economy. It is derived not so much
to meet the financial needs of the Federal establishment, but to insure
that the private economy achieves or maintains a stable growth. If the
economy requires stimulation, Federal expenditures must exceed reve-
nues. On the other hand, if the economy were advancing too rapidly
and inflation is apparent, revenues must exceed expenditures.
The Revenue Act of 1964, which enacted substantial tax cuts in
order to stimulate the economy, and the Revenue and Expenditure Control
Act of 1968, which enacted a surcharge on tax liabilities, are examples
of fiscal activism. This paper proposes to analyze both of these Acts
within a political and economic framework. The Acts will be traced
from conception to enactment, and to the subsequent effect that they
had on the economy.
The analysis will include 'he following:
1. The political proble .hat arose as the government
attempted to become an active participant in the private economy; more
specifically, the political problems associated with increasing the
Federal deficit at a time when it was at an all time high, as was the
case in 1963;

32. The economic theory of fiscal activism or the "new
economies'*
;
3. A comparison of the Revenue Act of 1964 and the Revenue
and Expenditure Control Act of 1968;
4. The political and eoonomio significance of the relation-
ship of unemployment to inflation.

CHAPTER II
THE EISENHOWER YEARS --THE ELEVENTH HOUR
OF FISCAL ORTHODOXY
In 1958 unemployment in the civilian labor force was 6.8 per
cent. The economy was suffering its third reoession since the end of
World War II. This recession, although not serious in terms of pro-
ductivity, by employment measures was the worst. The economy had not
performed so poorly since the 1930* s when unemployment ranged from 15
to 20 per cent.
Even though the unemployment total was in excess of 4.6 million,
the enemy of economic growth was not unemployment but inflation—or so
it seemed to the President, his advisors, and a majority of Congressmen
and Senators. In June of 1958 Senator Paul Douglas (D-Illinois) , after
eloquently reminding the Senate that government had pledged itself to
provide maximum employment by the Employment Act of 1946, requested an
immediate tax cut of six billion as the quickest way to alleviate the
unemployment problem. His resolution was, however, soundly defeated,
265-23. The majority believed that it would be "fiscally irresponsible"
to reduce taxes when the budget was already incurring a deficit.
Yet less than six years later, seventy -seven Senators cast their
support for a tax cut almost twice as large, one that was not temporary,
National Industrial Conference Board, Economic Almanac (New
York: MaoMillan Company, 1967), p. 27.
^J.S., Congressional Record , 1958, CIV (June 18), 11574.
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5and at a time when unemployment was less than in 1958. It was an un-
precedented action. In the political passing of those six years the
role of government in the management of the economy changed from that
of a passive agent that acted to prevent excess maladjustments to an
active participant, able and willing to use almost every economic
weapon at its disposal to insure dynamic growth and prosperity.
In the politicians' lexicon unemployment is often exchanged
with inflation as "the" vote getter. Since the elections of the 1930'
s
few politicians have doubted the efficacy of unemployment as a political
issue. After World War II, through the presidential election of 1952,
inflation captured the politicians' imagination. After 1952, however,
unemployment returned to the center of the political arena. It became
the crucial economic issue. In the recessions of 1953-54 and 1957-58
unemployment rose sharply above its previous levels. This was also
accompanied by a fear of eventual unemployment among many that were
still employed.
The political debate that ensued—Democrats accusing Republicans
of "callousness" toward unemployment, and Republicans accusing Democrats
of profligacy—carried on into the presidential election of 1960. As in
any collegiate debate, this one had an ephemeral victor—the Democrats
on the side of fiscal activism. From the Democrats a new political/
economic policy emerged, that of the "new economics." It was a marriage
of Keynesian theory, classical doctrine, and modern public administra-
tion. Its fruition was the Revenue Act of 1964 and the Revenue and
Expenditure Control Aot of 1968.
In order to understand the importance of this change in political
economics and the resulting fiscal activism, the clock must be turned

6back to the Eisenhower years—the years of fiscal orthodoxy—and proceed
with an analysis of one of the most significant economio debates of
modern times.
The landslide election of 1952 provided a presidential mandate
to Dwight D. Eisenhower. This mandate included, among other things, an
authority to practice fiscal orthodoxy—an orthodoxy that to Eisenhower
meant a reduction in governmental taxes and spending which would create
a balanced budget and an end to an inflation that had been politically
associated with Democratic economic policy. Eisenhower has stated that,
"I put myself on record as an enemy of inflation and expressed conviction
that excessive taxation could destroy the incentive to excel."-*- After
he assumed the office of President, he said, "There was no one among my
immediate associates not dedicated, in principle, to the proposition
that both Federal expenditures and the public debt must be reduced."**
The end of the Korean hostilities provided the means to start
reducing governmental expenditures as a beginning toward eventual tax
cuts. Although some people warned that a recession oould result from
such a polioy, the Administration was committed to the policy of curbing
inflation and, accordingly, ordered a sharp reduction in military expend-
itures. As a few had predicted, the economy entered into its second
recession since World War II.
There is widespread agreement that the cause of the 1953-54
recession was the reduction in military expenditures. Eisenhower,
himself, has refleoted that, "The contraction, in part, represented the
Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change (New York: Doubleday
and Co., 1963), p. 33.
%bid .. p. 127.

7efforts of businessmen to reduce inventories, and was aggravated by a
large reduction in military expenditures." Economist Alvin H. Hansen
has written that, "The recession . . . was due almost entirely to the
drop in government expenditures incident to the cessation of the Korean
oonflict. The decline in governmental outlays ... in real terms
amounted to $10.9 billion."2 In a Brookings Institution study, Bert G.
Hickman ooncluded that, "... the cutback in Federal expenditures was
the major deflationary force acting throughout the contraction. "*> Hick-
man computed the drop in Federal spending at $12 billion between the
seoond quarters of 1953 and 1954. Sherman Adams, advisor to President
Eisenhower, however, felt that credit policy was a major oause. "The
public finger was pointed at George Humphrey's (Secretary of the Treasury]
attempt to tighten oredit ... a little too much .... The crisis
passed, but it left its mark as an error in Humphrey's fiscal calcula-
tions."
The actual decline began in the middle of 1953. The Treasury
and the Federal Reserve System had already taken steps to ease oredit
in May by embarking on an extensive open market operation, and again in
June by lowering the reserve requirement of FED member banks. The
Counoil of Economic Advisors' Chairman, Arthur F. Burns, advised the
cabinet that some planning should be undertaken as a precaution against
U.S., President, Eoonomio Report of the President, 1955
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1955), p. iv.
James Tobin, ed., Economic Issues of the '60's (Boston, Mass.:
MoGraw Hill Co., 1960), p.146.
Bert G. Hickman, Growth and Stability of the Postwar Economy
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1960), p. 99.
4Sherman Adams, Firsthand Report (New York: Harper & Co., 1961),
p. 161.

8further decline. At this point, Eisenhover quiokly abandoned his
thoughts of fiscal orthodoxy. At a nevs conference in November of
1953, when asked about the possibility of a recession, he replied that,
"When it becomes clear that the Government has to step in, as far as I
am concerned, the full power of Government, of Government credit, and
of everything the Government has, will move in to see that there is no
widespread unemployment. "*
By early 1954, unemployment had risen to 5.8 per cent. Two
million more persons were unemployed than that of the previous year.
Sherman Adams and Robert Donovan, in their accounts of this period, both
portray the Administration as being ever-watchful over the economic
indicators. While intensive planning was going on under the supervision
of GEA Chairman Burns, Adams describes Eisenhower as "ready to launch a
public works program to ease unemployment if the emergency became dan-
gerous.*'2 Donovan saw a "striking picture of a President and his
Government grappling with trouble in a vast, complicated eoonomy."3
Despite Eisenhower's promise of an all-out effort if neoessary,
the Administration took a cautious view of heavy-handed fiscal action.
Instead, attempts to curb the downturn were more of a structural nature.
The temporary income and excess profits tax that had been levied during
the Korean Conflict, already soheduled to expire on 31 December 1954,
was allowed to expire. The President also recommended a broad program
of legislation which included tax proposals designed to stimulate business
^.S., President, Public Papers of the President, 1953 (Washing-




Robert J. Donovan, Eisenhower, The Inside Story (New York:
Harper A Co., Inc., 1956), p. 209.

9enterprise; e.g., liberalized depreciation allowance on new investments,
fuller treatment of researoh and development outlays as current expenses,
and partial tax oredits to recipients of dividends for the income taxes
already paid by corporations. Other beneficial legislation inoluded
expanding the soope and raising of the benefits provided by the old-age
and unemployment insurance system, extending and liberalizing credit
facilities for home ownership, and improving the nation's highways.
Congress gradually enacted many of these proposals and also added a
sizable cut in excise taxes, which, after allowing for an increase of
$1.3 billion in social security contributions, brought the various tax
reductions for individuals and businesses that became effective in 1954
to $6.1 billion. 1
Other action was taken in addition to the steps outlined above.
As in the middle of 1953, the FED lowered the disoount rate and the
reserve requirement rate of member banks in early 1954. Governmental
subsidies were given to some hard-pressed industries, such as ship-
building through a new construction program, and to zinc and lead mining
through a revised stockpiling program. The government made an effort
to assist depressed areas of the country by channeling governmental
contracts to them and by boosting the allowable rate of accelerated
amortization on such industrial investments in these areas in order
that the nation's defense base might be strengthened. Administrative
activities were carefully watched with an eye toward greater efficiency
and toward meeting the immediate needs of the economy. The Veterans
Administration speeded up the processing of loan guaranty applications
Arthur F. Burns, Prosperity Without Inflation (Garden City,
N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1958), p. 32.
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for loan insurance. The Department of Agriculture expedited arrange-
ments to stimulate private construction of grain elevators. The Internal
Revenue Service made advance payments to taxpayers who had been over-
assessed prior to the final determination of their over-assessment.
The Bureau of Public Roads lost no time in implementing its expanded
financial authority.
Although no massive spending programs were launched, the Admin-
istration attempted to halt the decline in governmental expenditure,
which, in the case of the Department of Defense, had been greater than
was originally planned or anticipated. A modest re -scheduling of expend-
itures within the total set for fiscal year 1955 was adopted with a view
toward raising the government's planned spending for the first six months
and thus reinforcing the economic recovery.
CEA Chairman Burns has concluded that the Administration's effort
to combat recession did not include a pre-planned strategy and such a
strategy, if it had existed, would more than likely have failed.
These actions to curb the decline of economic activity did
not express the unfolding of any master plan in which all details
had been worked out in advance and every contingency provided
for. Not only is this sort of theory practically impossible, but
any determined attempt to realize it could invite disaster. No
two recessions ever run the same course; unforeseen developments
are bound to occur; and measures that work well in one situation
may work badly in another. A wise government will therefore seek
to maintain flexibility in its approach and be prepared to do
more in one direction and less in another, besides trying new
measures. It will not entrust the nation's fate to a categorical
eoonomio forecast or to a rigid economic program.
^
There was little public mention of the recession by the Admin-
istration, especially in regard to the planning that had been taken to
XIbid.
foU.S., President, Economic Report of the President, 1955
, pp. 69-71,




fight the reoession. In foot, Eisenhower was publioly loath to mention
that the reoession was enough to warrant concern. In the 1954 Economic
Report of the President, Eisenhower acknowledged a "slight contraction
in business" and predicted that there would be no "serious interruption"
of economic growth. 1 In April of 1954, Eisenhower, in a television
speeoh, stated that he was concerned about the widespread talk of un-
employment and he was not considering any strong pump-priming action
until it was absolutely necessary. ^ in a news conference in May he was
asked to comment about a quote by Sumner Schliohter, a Harvard economist,
to the effect that the Administration had shown a "surprising lack of
initiative and enterprise" in fighting the recession. Eisenhower casu-
ally replied (it would seem) by referring such questions to "the Chief
of my Economic Advisors for his side of the story."3
Republican Congressmen were somewhat more critical of Democratic
claims of inaction. Joseph W. Martin, Jr. (R-Massachusetts) , the House
Speaker, led oritical attacks on the "left wing eggheads" that were
attempting to "yell the oountry into a recession."4 At one point, even
a Communist "red herring" was dragged across the economic debate.
Charles G. Oakman (R-Miohigan) said, "We do know that there are those
within our shores who are happy at any time to do the bidding of their
5Russian Masters."
U.S., President, Economic Report of the President. 1954
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1954), pp. iv-v.












For their own part, while quick to criticize the Republican
Administration, the Democrats did not develop any substantive anti-
recession program. Individual Senators and Congressmen advocated a
myriad of suggestions such as expanded public works, tax reductions,
cheaper money, enlarged sooial security, and anti -monopoly measures.
There was, however, little effort made to collect these voices into
anything that resembled an alternative program. The advocacy of a $5
billion tax out by some of the Democratic members of the Joint Economic
Committee under the leadership of Paul Douglas (D-Illinois) was the
nearest thing to a party policy that emerged in 1954.
This is not to say that the Democrats did not develop a campaign
issue during the Congressional elections of 1954. That issue centered
around the Republican Administration's attitude toward the whole gamut
of economic responsibility to the nation. Adlai Stevenson summated
this issue during the closing days of the campaign: "... the elec-
tion of a Democratic Congress on Tuesday . . . will chasten the Admin-
istration's complacent attitude toward the millions of Americans who
cannot find jobs."-*-
The Democrats were successful in the 1954 Congressional election
to the extent that they won control of both Houses of Congress by a
margin, which indicated that the issue of unemployment was a factor in
"chastening" the Administration. Statistical studies oonduoted by
James L. Sundquist for a Brookings Institution study, while not proving
conclusively that unemployment or the fear of unemployment was the
principal cause for the shift in voter preference, do, however, indioate
p. 92.
^Adlai Stevenson, "What I Think," Harper's . October, 1956,
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that there vas a high degree of correlation betveen the timing of voter
switching with the high unemployment mark during 1954.
. . . The decisive swing in voter preference that resulted in
the restoration of Democratic control of Congress occurred when
the recession struck in the winter [as supported by Sundquist's
and other statistical surveys] , and that the voters whose
loyalties were then switched remained on the Demooratio side.l
The second recession of the 1950 's occurred by happenstance at
the same time as the mid-term Congressional election of 1958. The
1957-58 recession was greater, albeit shorter, than that of 1953-54.
The seasonally adjusted percentage of unemployment in October 1957 was
4.7 per cent of the labor force. By February, 1958, that figure had
risen to 6.7 per cent. Perhaps the unadjusted rate of unemployment
for this period is more indicative of the hardships that can cause
political reaction. Between October, 1957, and February, 1958, unem-
ployment more than doubled. The numbers of unemployed in February
exceeded five million, the largest sinoe the 1930*s. The February
3
unadjusted rate was 7.7 per cent.
The Democrats again pursued the issue of recession and Repub-
lican inadequacies. There was some feeling among Democrats and busi-
nessmen that the recession had actually been planned so as to achieve
price stability to ward off inflation. The following appeared in Time
magazine:
Many businessmen received the dip at year's end (1957]
without alarm because they regarded it as a "recession as
planned." . . . Though no one wants unemployment, coldly
James L. Sundquist, Politics and Policy (Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Institution, 1968), p. 441.







statistical economists can find some virtue in it, expect
the U.S. to benefit through increased productivity . . .
Moreover, as jobs grow scarcer, wages will flatten out. 1
Congressman John A. Carroll (D-Colorado) quoted William McChesney
Martin, Jr., FED Chairman, as saying that the recession was "deeper and
sharper" than had been "anticipated." Senator Hubert H. Humphrey
(D -Minnesota) remarked on the Senate floor that, "The Administration's
recession blueprint has come into full flower ... I trust that the
Republican Party is pleased at its success. I hope the Administration
•z
continues to sit on its collective hands."
The Administration oontinued to follow the policy that they
believed brought success in 1954. The government's economists did not
believe that the economy needed a boost. To them, the new recession
would be a repeat of 1953-54 and would quickly end. They wanted to
avoid what in 1954 Eisenhower had called "slambang emergency programs."
The Administration was to again give appearances of cool appraisal of
the economic situation. Anything other than that would be injurious to
the public confidence that was necessary to restore the economy.
To compound the Administration's problems, Eisenhower had
enoountered in 1957 what was to him an even more perfidious enemy
—inflation. The Administration was very doubtful about the efficacy
of an active fiscal policy as remedial action to a depressed economy if
that policy created the seminal beginnings of inflation. At a February,
1958, news conference, Eisenhower was asked about a possible tax cut.
He responded that it would be a stimulus to the economy; but he added,
"Nation's Business," Time , December 30, 1957, pp. 53, 55.







. . . this is something you can take hold of and, going too far with
trying to fool with our economy, then you get something else started.
And you just remember, all of you here a year ago, how we were always
talking about inflation and the things we were trying to study."^
As if on cue, the Democrats responded with a rash of economio
programs as widespread as the ones of 1954
—
public works, tax reduction,
increases in minimum wages, expanded unemployment insurance, liberalized
housing credit, farm price support, etc. As in 1954, these individual
programs did not create an alternative policy. Many Democrats, however,
convinoed Senate Majority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson (D-Texas) to develop
a Democratic policy. This was done and was accordingly introduced to
the Senate in March, 1958. The policy amounted to a resolution for the
Administration to speed up certain civilian and military expenditures
within the limits of existing authority and appropriations. There was
a great amount of political in-fighting as a result of this resolution;
the Administration believed that they were doing everything possible,
including aocelerated expenditures, and was affronted by the Democratic
resolution. In a short time, this quarrel was ended by an addition to
the resolution commending the Administration for its continuing efforts
in fighting recession; the resolution passed both Houses with little
more debate.
It was at this time that a new force began to enter into this
politioal -economic arena; fiscal activists, both inside and outside of
Congress, concentrated their efforts upon tax reduction as the most
effective means of stimulating the economy. Political leadership for
•Hj.S., President, Public Papers of the President, 1958
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1959), p. 147.
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this cause centered with a former economics professor, Senator Paul
Douglas. He argued that a publio works program of large expenditures
efficiently conceived and executed would still be too slow to stimulate
the economy. Over a period of five months, he presented his arguments
for a temporary tax cut and support for his ideas gradually increased.
The Democratic Advisory Council endorsed the idea in April, 1958. This
endorsement was followed by a similar endorsement from the prestigious
Committee for Economic Development. The U.S. Chamber of Commeroe, the
President of General Motors, Chairman of the Board of J. P. Morgan and
Company, AFL-CIO President, Budget Director Percival P. Brundage, and
CEA Chairman Burns all added their support to the tax cut.^- Former FED
Board member Mariner S. Eocles, appearing before the Senate Finance
Committee in April, presented an argument for the tax out that would
become the logic for a similar request six years later:
If recovery can be hastened by a tax reduction, and I believe
it can, it is reasonable to expect that even lower tax rates will
soon be offset by the growth in the national income. Therefore,
a balanced budget could be achieved through such recovery, whereas
with higher tax rates and a depressed economy, the Government
revenue would be diminished and a balanced budget impossible. I
believe the Government deficit over the next two years, and hence
the public debt, will be less if an adequate tax-reduction program
is promptly adopted than would be the case if the oountry had to
wait for the stimulating effect of increased Government spending.
The tax cut bill that Senator Douglas introduced in March amounted
to a $5.2 billion reduction that was divided between personal income and
excise taxes. The ensuing debate over the tax cut bill was involved and
at times acrimonious.
"Hj.S., Congressional Record , 1958 (as quoted on Jan. 28, Aug. 4,
March 11), 11597, 15980-82, 3898-3901.
*TJ.S., Congress, Senate, Finanoe Committee, Hearings, Investiga-
tions of the Financial Conditions of the United States
, 85th Cong. , 2nd
Sess., 1958, pp. 4274-4302.

17
Senator John J. WILLIAMS, (R -Delaware ) : I do not believe a tax
reduction should be financed with borrowed money ... A govern-
ment cannot spend itself into prosperity any more than can an
individual.
Senator Charles E. POTTER, (D-Michigan) : It is rather hard to
get the people of Michigan concerned about inflation when
350,000 of the people of Michigan are unemployed.
WILLIAMS : But a tax reduction is not what they want. What those
men want are jobs ....
POTTER: But the tax reduction will put the economio machine back
into operation, and in that way jobs will be provided.
WILLIAMS: No good will be done if the solvency of the Government
is destroyed. *
At the end of the debating, not unlike this, the bill was defeated,
71-14.
Senator Douglas tried another tax cut bill in June for the
amount of $6 billion. He again was defeated, 65-23. There is some
speculation that one of the reasons for the inability of the Democratic
Senators to rally behind Douglas is because of an agreement reached
between Speaker Samuel Rayburn, Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson, and
Secretary of the Treasury Robert Anderson. The agreement was that
neither side would try to gain political advantage over the other by
independently pushing for the tax bill. Eisenhower indicated at a news
conference in early April that the three would consult together before
any tax cut would be introduced in Congress.
^
The importance of the three-way agreement of prior consultation
may have been that the Democratic two -thirds of the group, while
ostensibly reflecting bi-partisan unity over such a serious issue, may
have instead felt that if anyone should get in political trouble because
•kf.S., Congressional Record
. 1958, 4285-87.




of the miscalculated effeots of a tax cut, it should be the Administra-
tion. At any rate, the support for Douglas never materialized. As if
by some magical machine capable of turning back the clock to 1954, the
1957-58 recession turned into recovery in the Spring of 1958. The
recession had been brief and after it had bottomed out, the recovery
was swift. The spending and credit measures had taken effect and
Eisenhower noted that, "the storm was over."^ By the measure of unem-
ployment, the "storm" had been worse than the one in 1954. Unemployment
in October, 1958, adjusted for seasonal variation, was 7.1 per cent. 3
The November Congressional elections resulted in a buildup of Democratic
control over both Houses; they gained a net total of thirteen seats in
the Senate and forty -seven in the House. As in 1954, unemployment and
the recession were not the sole issues of the campaign. Eisenhower end
many others, however, rate them as a principal factor in the Republican
losses. 4,5
With the election of 1958 out of the way and the economy on the
road to reoovery, the Administration returned to the more orthodox
theories of fiscal policy. Inflation became the target for governmental
aotivity. The fiscal year 1960 budget was a balanced budget and it in-
cluded a $4 billion reduction in expenditures. Eisenhower has since
written that some of his advisors argued against so soon a return to a
Sundquist, Politics and Policy
, p. 27.
%>wight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace (Garden City, N.Y.: Double-











balanced budget; but the important consideration then was a deteriorating
balance of payments situation and the need to strengthen the confidence
that foreign bankers held in the dollar.
The economic events of 1959 proved that success in dealing with
recessions was not a reality. Although production did rise, and rise
rapidly, the last half of 1958 and the first half of 1959, employment
did not. Throughout 1959, unemployment remained at 5.5 per cent. 2 In
some industries, such as steel, production had spurted ahead without a
sizable reduction of unemployed steel workers.
The remainder of the Eisenhower years evidences an increase in
his determination to represent fiscal "integrity." His budget was
balanced. He wanted Presidential authority to veto speoific sections
of appropriations bills. He sought to have price stability included as
.
a specifio goal of the Employment Act of 1946. Vice-President Nixon was
designated as head of a Cabinet committee on price stability. Many
expenditure bills sent to him by the heavily Democratic Congress were
vetoed. It was with this ideology that the Republicans entered the
1960 Presidential campaign.
A most devastating blow fell to fiscal orthodoxy in March, 1959.
The Joint Economic Committee under Chairman Douglas prepared a report
that stated that the majority of the Committee believed that the infla-
tion so readily pursued by the Administration hardly existed.
The consensus of the expert testimony presented to the
committee in its hearings . . . was that substantial stability
in the price level will probably require less emphasis in







the Employment Act. . . . Sinoe early 1958 ... a high degree
of stability in prices overall has been achieved.
Examination of the facts belies the widespread impression
that the economy has been persistently plagued since the end of
the var with "classical" inflationary pressures. . . . Until
evidence of an imminent inflationary threat can clearly be seen
... a reasonable and sane policy aimed at promoting maximum
employment and production and vigorous expansion of the economy
should not be unduly deterred by the possibility of future
inflation.
On the basis of the present eoonomic outlook, principal
emphasis in public policy this year should be placed on prompt
and full recovery from the 1957-58 reoession.-*-
The minority Republican report, however, stressed the perils of
inflation. "... [it is now] the gravest potential obstacle to the
achievement of high and rising rates of economic growth and improve-
ment."2
The Joint Eoonomic Committee then turned to the preparation of
another report, Employment. Growth, and Price Levels . An extensive
report, this study was to eventually become the cornerstone of the
Democratic polioy platform in 1960.
The Democratic charges of Republican mismanagement and slow
economic growth were reinforced by another small recession in 1960. It
was the third recession in six years. It appears to have been enough
to return the Demoorats to the Executive Branch of the Government. » 4
An opinion by Robert Lekachman summates succinctly the Republican
U.S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Report of the Joint
Economic Committee on the January 1959 Economic Report of the President
.





3Sundquist, Politics and Policy
, pp. 463-66.





By the criteria of the Employment Act of 1946, by the
principles of public finance, the Republican economic policy
was a failure. In 1960 the party paid the appropriate
electoral price. •*-




THE REVENUE ACT OF 1964
The new President, John F. Kennedy, entered office with a dismal
appraisal of the eoonomy.
We take office in the wake of seven months of recession,
three and one -half years of slack, seven years of diminished
eoonomio growth. . . . Our recovery from the 1958 recession,
moreover, was anemic and incomplete. Our Gross National Product
never regained its full potential. Unemployment never returned
to normal levels. Maximum use of our national industrial capac-
ity was never restored. This Administration does not intend to
stand helplessly by . . . .*•
Despite the foroefulness of those words, they belied the Admin-
istration's early attempts to foster eoonomio growth. Kennedy's initial
steps to oombat the fourth postwar recession were in many ways identical
to his predecessor. Authorized spending was accelerated, temporary
extensions of unemployment benefits were sought, and a tax reform
measure was requested to stimulate investment. A tax cut, however, was
rejected until the situation approached more urgent proportions.
The economists who favored an active fiscal policy and who also
were practitioners of the Keynesian school of eoonomio thought were now
inside the government. Kennedy had selected Walter Heller as his CEA
Chairman; the other Council members selected were James Tobin and Kermit
Gordon, all proponents of the "new economics." Kennedy, himself, also
hj.S., President, Public Papers of the President, 1961
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1962), pp. 19-20, State






came under the counsel of such liberal non-government economists as
Seymour Harris of Harvard and Paul Samuelson of M.I.T. All of these
men gradually generated an influence with the new President. This was
no little effort. According to Harris' and Heller's accounts of this
period, Kennedy was not easily convinced of the exact role of fiscal
activism envisaged by his economists. ^ Especially consistent and per-
sistent in his views, Heller probably exerted the most economic influ-
ence on the President. Theodore Sorenson has written that the Council
kept the President "buried under a tide of memoranda. They became the
most highly influential and frequently consulted Council of Economic
Advisors in history. "^
Heller has written that:
President Kennedy's occasional doubts and concessions to
prevailing economic sentiment stand out only as detours on his
road to modernism. What was pleasing to his economic advisors,
and fortunate for the country, was his responsiveness to analysis
,
the foroe of economic logic and fact; to analogy , the demonstrated
success of Keynesian policies abroad; and to anomaly , the continued
sacrifice of human and material resources on the altar of false
concepts of "sound finance. "^
The acceptance by Kennedy of the tenets of the new eoonomics was
a slow prooess requiring over two years. The political realities of the
times, the Berlin Crisis of 1961, and the question of a tax increase to
meet international commitments, and a recovering economy, created an
intransigence in Congress against the unorthodox methods of fiscal policy,
•'Seymour H. Harris, The Economics of the Kennedy Years (New York:
Harper and Row, 1964), pp. 24-27. Walter W. Heller, New Dimensions .






In June of 1962, the recovering economy faltered. Also in June,
Kennedy delivered his famous Yale speech where he attacked the "myths"
concerning the national economy, pointing out that Federal deficits
create inflation and budget surpluses prevent it. Yet, even after this
public display of the perils of fiscal orthodoxy, Kennedy was not pre-
pared to follow up with a request for a tax cut. Heller oonsiders
December of 1962 as the low point in Kennedy's determination to follow
through on a tax cut. The cabinet had strongly opposed it in favor of
inoreased publio expenditures. Also, John Kenneth Galbraith, an econo-
mist of whom Kennedy thought highly, had argued to the President that
increased public expenditures in poverty programs was the correct way
to influence the economy. Kennedy's enthusiasm for the tax cut was to
return, however, after his highly suocessful speech to the Boonomic Club
of New York that same month. * This speech contained the first public
explanation by the President of why a tax cut was necessary:
The final and best means of strengthening demand among
consumers and businesses is to reduce the burden on private
income and the deterrents to private initiative which are
imposed by our present tax system. . . .
I am talking about the accumulated evidence of the last
five years, that our present tax system, developed as it was,
in good part, during World War II to restrain growth, exerts
too heavy a drag on growth in peaoetime; that it siphons out
of the private economy too large a share of personal and busi-
ness purchasing power; that it reduces the financial incentives
for personal effort, investment, and risk-taking.
Any new tax legislation enacted next year should meet the
following three tests: First, it should reduce net taxes by a
sufficiently large amount to do the job required. . . . Too
large a tax cut, of course, could result in inflation and in-
sufficient future revenue—but the greater danger is a tax cut
too little or too late to be effective.
"'•Ibid ., pp. 34-35.
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Second, the new tax bill must increase private consumption
as well as investment. . . .
Third, the new tax bill should improve both the equity and
simplicity of our present system. This means the enactment of
long needed tax reforms, a broadening of the tax base and the
elimination or modification of many special tax privileges.
Our true choice is not between tax reduction, on the one
hand, and the avoidance of large Federal deficits on the other.
It is increasingly clear that no matter what party is in power,
so long as our national security needs keep rising, an economy
hampered by restrictive tax rates will never produce enough
revenue to balanoe our budget just as it will never produce
enough jobs or enough profits. Surely the lesson of the last
decade is that budget defioits are not caused by wild-eyed
spenders, but by slow eoonomio growth and periodic recessions,
and any new recession would break all defioit records.
In short, it is a paradoxical truth that tax rates are too
high today and tax revenues are too low, and the soundest way
to raise revenues in the long run is to out taxes now. The ex-
perience of a number of European countries and Japan have borne
this out. And the reason is that only full employment can
balance the budget, and tax reduction can pave the way to that
employment. The purpose of cutting taxes now is not to incur a
budget deficit, but to achieve the more prosperous, expanding
economy which can bring a budget surplus. 1
If the Administration was convinced that a tax out was needed in
1963, some influential Congressmen were not. The following excerpts
from a news magazine are remarks made by Congressman Wilbur Mills
(D -Arkansas ) , Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee:
There probably will not be a deterioration [in the economy]
during the early part of 1963. On the basis of that projection
. . . there would seem little justification for a "quickie" tax
cut effective Jan. 1, 1963. . . .
I cannot go along with the idea that you just cut taxes
without regard to the deficit that is created. . . .
I doubt that you oould sell a tax cut alone for purposes
of trying to do something to the economy until it's generally
discernible that a downturn is coming. . . .~
•'"U.S., President, Public Papers of the President, 1962 , pp. 877-80.
2
"Why a Tax Cut is Unlikely in , 63," U.S. News and World Report
.
December 17, 1962, pp. 42-45.
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To the average citizen the prospects of a tax out would seem to
be inherently appealing. This idea, however, had to counter with the
popular belief in the necessity of a balanced budget. The concept that
individuals cannot increase their prosperity by defioit spending was
likewise true for governmental budgeting was deeply entrenched in the
public mind as good eoonomic theory and also as a moral precept. A
major educational requirement became obvious. The public had to be
convinced that they should not only aooept a tax cut and, therefore,
increased income with equanamity, but also regard the resulting short
term budget deficit as a non-value essential for an ultimate full
employment economy.
The Administration put great emphasis on its educational efforts,
The support of business was sought and received. The U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers, the American
Bankers Association, and the New York Stock Exchange are jus -! a few of
the prestigious associations that lent their support to the tax cut.
For technical support, the Administration received the endorsement of
400 economists who agreed with the theory and the timing. The most
important convert, however, was Wilbur Mills, without whose support a
tax reduction bill would have died a slow death in committee. Sorenson
reflects that,
Slowly the President brought him around. Initially Mills agreed
to a major tax reform bill, with a little tax reduction to help
it along. When presented, it was a tax reform and tax reduction
bill. In testimony, it became a tax reduction and tax reform
bill. And when it was reported out by Mills, the President had
"4?he support from these associations as well as that from the
economists was, in the main, theoretical support. In later testimony
at Mills' committee hearings many of these associations and individuals
took exception to specific proposals in the recommended bill.

27
his major tax cut bill with a little tax reform.
The original request for tax reform and tax reduction was sub-
mitted to Congress by the President under the title, "Revisions of our
Tax Structure," on January 24, 1963. After an introduction similar in
content to Kennedy's Economic Club of New York speech, the following was
proposed:
1. Reduction in individual inoome tax rates from the present
levels of 20 to 91 per oent, to a range of 14 to 65 per cent;
2. Reduction in the rate of the Corporate inoome tax from 52
per cent to 47 per cent;
3. Reversal of the Corporate normal and surtax rate so that
the tax rate applicable to the first $25,000 of corporate inoome would
drop from 30 to 22 per cent, so as to give particular encouragement to
small businessmen;
4. Acceleration of tax payments by corporations with anticipated
tax liabilities of more than $100,000 to bring the corporate payment
schedule to a current basis over a five year period;
5. Revision of the tax treatment of capital gains, designed to
provide a freer and fuller flow of capital funds and to provide a
greater equity;
6. Removal of oertain inequities and hardships in the present
tax structure; and
7. Broadening the tax base of the individual and corporate
income taxes to remove unwarranted speoial privileges, correct defects
in the tax law, and provide more equal treatment of taxpayers—thereby





possible, and making possible the proposal to alleviate hardships and
inequities.
Enactment of this program, according to the President's message,
would strengthen every segment of the national economy vhile at the same
time bring to fruition the goals of the Employment Act of 1946.
Total output and economic growth will be stepped up by an
amount several times as great as the tax out itself. Total in-
come will rise—billions of dollars more will be earned each year
in profits and wages. Investment and productivity improvement
will be spurred on by more intensive use of present productive
potential; and the added incentives to risk-taking will speed
the modernization of Amerioan industry. Additional dollars spent
by consumers or invested by producers will lead to more jobs,
more plant capacity, more markets, and thus still more dollars
for consumption and investment. Idle manpower and plant capacity
make this possible without inflation; and strong and healthy
eoonomic activity is the best insurance against future recession.
Unemployment will be reduced, as firms throughout the country
hire new workers to meet the new demands released by tax reduction.
The economic prospects of our depressed area will improve as in-
vestors obtain new incentives to create additional productive
facilities in areas of laboi surplus. . . .
Price stability can be maintained. Inflationary forces need
not be revived by strengthening the economy at a time of a sub-
stantial unemployment and unused capacity with a properly con-
ducted program of tax reduction. With the gains in disposable
income of wage earners there should be less pressure for wage
increases in excess of productivity—and with inoreased profits
after tax there should be no pressure to raise prices. . . .
This nation is growing--its needs are growing—and tax revision
now will steadily increase our capacity to meet those needs at a
time when there is no major bottle-necks in manpower, plant, or
resources, no emergencies straining reserves of productive power,
and no lack of vigorous competition from other nations. 2
The proposed rate reductions would not become fully effective
until January 1, 1965. They would provide, in total, a reduction in tax
liabilities of $13.6 billion; $11 billion for individuals, and $2.6
U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Ways and Means, Hearings,
The Tax Recommendations of the President Contained in his Message






billion for corporations. Other adjustments, some of which lose and
some of which gain revenue, would on balance produce a revenue gain of
$3.4 billion leaving a net reduction of $10.2 billion.
The $11 billion reduction in personal liabilities would take
effect over a three -year period:
1. Calendar year 1963 - a rate sohedule of 18.5 to 84.5 per
cent and reducing the appropriate withholding rate upon enactment from
18 per cent to 15.5 per cent. The new tax rate would apply to the
entire calendar year and, therefore, would require a lower withholding
rate to prevent overwithholding;
2. Calendar year 1964 - a rate schedule of 15.5 to 71.5 per
cent, effective for the entire year, and a withholding rate of 13.5 per
cent as of July 1 of that year;
3. Calendar year 1965 and thereafter - a permanent rate schedule
of 14 to 65 per cent, maintaining the withholding rate of 13.5 per cent.^
The reduotion in the corporate income tax rate would cut corpo-
rate tax liabilities by $2.6 billion per year. This would be in addition
to the reduotion of $2 billion per year provided by the 1962 investment
tax credit and depreciation reform. The corporate rate reduction would
also take effect over a three -year period.
1. Calendar year 1963 - present normal tax of 30 per cent,
applicable to the first $25,000 of taxable corporate income, would drop
to ZZ per cent while the rates applicable to income in excess of $25,000
would remain at 52 per cent. This, in effect, reverses the present
normal tax of 30 per cent and the surtax of ZZ per cent. The normal tax
would remain permanently at 22 per cent;
•'•Ibid ., pp. 13-14.
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2. Calendar year 1964 - corporate surtax would be reduoed to
28 per oent, thereby lowering the combined oorporate rate to 50 per cent;
3. Calendar year 1965 and thereafter - oorporate surtax would
be reduoed to 25 per cent, thereby lowering the combined corporate rate
to 47 per cent.
While the rhetoric of the Kennedy tax message is easy to enjoy,
it still must be grounded in sound logic, analysis, and empirical expe-
rience. In order to review the theory of this particular tax cut, it
is necessary to review the whole relationship of Keynesian economics to
public finance.** This relationship is centered around Gross National
Product, capital investment, and consumption, or that part of disposable
income that is consumed. These relationships can be seen in the national
income accounts that measure Gross National Product (GNP) . Table 3-1
summarizes these relationships.
An increase in product of investment or consumption goods means
an increase in GNP. What this means for DI (and thus for C) depends on
what happens to DI as GNP changes. If a billion dollars added to GNP
always meant a billion dollars added to DI, there would be no problem;
this is not the oase. To find out what happens to C (and therefore to
GNP) , it is first necessary to establish what changes can be expected
in each of the items that intervene between GNP and DI when GNP changes.
Business transfer payments can be disposed of easily—they are
first subtracted (3) and then added (9). Of the remaining items, seven
(2, 4, 5, 8, 10, 11, 12) are government items; three (1, 6, 7) are
•'•Ibid
., pp. 14-15.
^The following analysis is derived from Garder Ackley, Macro,





GNP (gross national product)
minus 1. capital consumption allowance (depreciation)
equals
NNP (net national product)
minus 2. indirect business taxes
minus 3. business transfer payments
minus 4. current surplus of government enterprises minus
subsidies equals
NI (national income)
minus 5. oorporate profit taxes
minus 6. corporate undistributed profits
minus 7. corporate inventory valuation adjustment
minus 8. contributions to social insurance
plus 9. business transfer payments
plus 10. government transfer payments
plus 11. government interest equals
PI (personal income)
minus 12. personal taxes equals
DI (disposable income)
minus 13. personal savings equals
C (consumption expenditures)
business items. There are three classes of taxes, all of vhich are sub-
tracted in going from GNP to DI. Some of these taxes can be considered
as independent of GNP, such as property taxes and corporate franchise
taxes. Most taxes, however, to one degree or another, produce higher
revenues as GNP expands. Some, such as sales taxes, expand roughly in
proportion to GNP; others, such as personal income taxes, expand more
than in proportion. Corporate profits taxes play a peculiarly strategic
role. These taxes are a rough constant proportion of profits before
tax, but profits of corporations are very sensitive to changes in GNP.
A rise or fall in GNP tends to be accompanied by a proportionately much
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the already existing volume of depreciable assets. In fact, there is
also some tendency for these allowances to be adjusted upward in good
times and down in bad times as accountants attempt to protect the re-
ported profit position of their firms from undue fluctuation. The
effect is probably small, but it does aot as a stabilizer. Corporate
saving is one of the most important stabilizers. When corporate profits
fall, businesses often fail to reduce dividends, or reduce them by much
less. This means that corporate saving may easily go from a large
positive figure in prosperous times to a negative figure in recessions;
and vice versa. Because of the already mentioned sensitivity of profits
to business conditions, this effect has considerable strategic importance
as a stabilizer.
An example of the use of fiscal policy, albeit a somewhat acci-
dental use to this end, is provided by the already discussed 1953-54
recession. Using the quarterly series (seasonally -adjusted at annual
rates) of the U.S. Department of Commerce, the peak of GNP was reached
in the second quarter of 1953, and the trough in the second quarter of
1954. Table 3-2 presents the relevant figures for these two quarters
and shows the ohanges between them.
Over this period, investment and government expenditures de-
clined by a total of $14.6 billion. There was an increase in the export
surplus of $1.5 billion and an increase of consumption of $3.2 billion,
producing a net decline in GNP of $9.9 billion. The important fact is
that consumption increased in the face of a sizable deorease in GNP.
The detail of the table provides the reason for this.
An unfavorable factor was the rise in capital consumption allow-
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the extra depreciation on new capital equipment added over the year.
Despite some drop in output and the reduction of some Federal excise
taxes, indirect business tax collections also rose, reflecting rate in-
creases by state and local governments. A third unfavorable factor was
the increase in social insurance contributions of $.7 billion instead
of the expected decline. This was the result of higher contribution
rates which became effective during this period.
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These unfavorable developments were more than offset. Corporate
profits fell by $5.0 billion. This vas the result of two factors:
1) corporate profits before taxes fell considerably, thereby causing a
reduction of several billion in taxes; 2) the excess profits were
abolished. Although after-tax profits still declined, corporations did
not reduce their dividends; thus, corporate undistributed profits fell
by $3.4 billion. Personal taxes fell by almost 10 per cent, partly as
a result of the lower tax base associated with lower incomes, and partly
through a reduotion of Federal income tax rates. Transfer payments in-
creased by $2.2 billion, partly as an automatic result of unemployment,
and partly through an upward revision of the benefit struoture. Thus,
as a result of built-in flexibility plus reductions of Federal tax rates
and liberalization of transfer payments, consumer disposable income in-
creased by two billion dollars. A further unexpected bonus oame from a
reduction of personal saving so that consumption spending increased by
$3.2 billion. 1
This is a fairly simple example of how the built-in stabilizers
of the fiscal system, plus a little tax cut, helped to prevent what
might have been a severe reduction of output based on the amount of
decline in investment and government spending. Instead of a decline in
consumption spending being piled on top of the decline in investment
and government spending, consumption actually held firm and led the way
to subsequent recovery.
The foregoing relationships can be expressed in a simple mathe-






and as such is the rationale for a tax cut to promote full employment.
In its more sophisticated forms, it predicted the results of the
Revenue Act of 1964.
If it can be assumed that all consumer earnings are not received
as personal income and accept the view that consumption expenditures
depend upon disposable income (a view that was not so easily accepted
in Congressional hearings on the tax cut) , the consumption function can
be expressed as
:
1. C = A BYd
where Y^ is disposable income. This income consists of several elements:
2. Yd =Y-D-T+R
where Y is gross national product, D depreciation, T the aggregate volume
of tax collections, and R the volume of transfer payments. To keep the
model simple, it will be assumed that all corporate profits are distrib-
uted in dividends. Gross national product consists, then, of three
parts
:
3. Y = C + G + I
where G is the volume of government expenditures on goods and services
and I is gross investment. A closed economy is assumed (no foreign




4. Y = 1 (A - BD - BT + BR + G + I)
1 - B
This expression indicates that a change in government expendi-
tures G is subject to the regular Keynesian multiplier of l/(l-B) where
B is the marginal propensity to consume disposable income on the
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assumption that the other variables within the parentheses (D, T, R,
and I) do not ohange as G and Y change. On the other hand, a change in
T, all other variables constant, will produce a ohange in Y equal to
the change in T times -B/(l-B). This tax multiplier is negative because
a decrease in taxes will increase income and it is necessarily smaller
than the government expenditures multiplier because B is necessarily
less than 1. An increase in transfer payments is subject to the same
multiplier with reversed sign, B/(l-B).
Thus, these elementary manipulations reveal that, for example,
a one billion increase in government deficit oaused by an increase in
expenditures, taxes, and transfers held constant, will have a larger
effect on income and output than the same change of deficit created by
a tax reduction. The reason is that a deficit increase of one billion
dollars, created by higher spending on current output, creates in the
first instance an increase of one billion in output which is subject to
the multiplier. If taxes are reduced by one billion, the initial in-
crease in demand and output is for consumer goods. This increase will
not be one billion, but B times one billion, for 1-B of the tax reduc-
tion will be added to savings by the initial beneficiaries. This in
turn is subject to the usual multiplier, l/(l-B) , making the total
increase B/(l-B).
One useful extension of this model is to determine how much
taxes should be reduced to achieve a full employment gross national
product. Assume the relevant functions to be as follows:
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in billions of dollars
C = 10 .8Yd 1=5+ .111
Yd = Y - D - T f R D=10
Y = C v G + I R =
T = .2Y
Solving this model yields the expression:
Y = 28 + 4G
Thus, if G equals 30, Y is 148, T is 29.6, Yd is 108.4, C is 96.72,
I is 21.28. If it is known that at full employment, given the present
availability of resources and oapaoity, gross national product would be
equal to 200, what amount of reduction of taxes from the present level
of 29.6 would be required to raise GNP to that 200 level? Substituting
the known variables into equation 4 gives:
200 a 1 (10 - 8 - ,8T + 30 21.28)
1-.8
Solving for T yields:
T = 16.6
At the 148 level of GNP, tax collections amounted to 29.6 At the 200
level of GNP, with all other expenditures held constant, tax collections
would drop to 16.6, or a reduction of 13.0.
The use of models such as above can be extremely useful in the
pursuit of an active fiscal policy. Yet, it must be remembered that
their applicability is specifically limited by the assumptions employed
in the models. These assumptions, and therefore some of the criticisms,
are as follows:
1. As already noted, the fiscal assumptions are crude, such as
a single tax function applicable to aggregate inoome, and a single aver-
age consumptions function which is also applicable to limited groups,
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i.e., taxpayers. In defense, however, refinement requires more elaborate
theories and, therefore, introduces new sources of error.
2. The model is static. The assumption, therefore, implied in
its use, is that an equilibrium analysis can be relevant to policy mat-
ters. Specifically, the analysis compares an initial equilibrium situ-
ation with a new equilibrium which results from the introduction of
given changes in taxes. Is the situation of the economy in whioh suoh
changes may be introduced ever an equilibrium one? Does a new equilib-
rium result, and within a time frame that makes the analysis meaningful?
3. The analysis is limited to situations of less than full
employment, whioh is to say that there are unused resources available
for production.
4. Closely related to the above, the analysis is conduoted
either on the assumption of constant wages and prices or else that wages
can change without affecting any of the relationships of the model. To
assume that wages and prioes can remain unchanged in the face of sub-
stantial changes in the level of demand, output, and employment is
probably not realistic
5. The rate of interest is assumed not to vary, or else that
its variation makes no difference.
6. The assumption is made that real consumption expenditure is
a stable function of real disposable income. This means that the price
level, rate of interest, quantity of money or total assets, and the
distribution of income are of little or no ooncern.
7. The assumption is made that real investment is either
(a) autonomous or (b) a function of real total output. This assumes
that private investment is either (a) unaffected by the volume of
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government expenditure and by the levels of tax rates or (b) is affeoted
only through the net effeot of these on the level of income. The possi-
bility that changes in tax rates may affect the willingness of entre-
preneurs to assume investment risks is thus assumed away.
8. A closed eoonomy is assumed. This is not appropriate for an
economy in vhioh international transactions are important.
9. It is implied in the previous assumptions that purely
financial aspeots of government fiscal operations make no difference.
That is, if there is a government deficit, it matters not whether the
deficit is financed by borrowing from the publio, from the banking
system, or by printing money. Monetary policy makes no difference.
This is sometimes treated as more than an assumption. Some argue that
finance oen make no difference. If government defioits and/or invest-
ments increase, savings must increase in an identical amount. If the
government deficit is financed by selling bonds, the public oan buy
these bonds with the enlarged savings. If the deficit is financed by
the printing press, the new money becomes the asset form in which the
enlarged saving is held.-*-
Before returning to the Revenue Act of 1964, two important
theoretical concepts should be discussed—"fiscal drag M and "full-
employment surplus."
Fiscal drag is the name for the automatic growth in tax revenues
in an economy with a progressive tax structure and steady overall
growth. As the eoonomy grows more and more, revenue is siphoned off
from personal income. As can be readily seen, fiscal drag is one side






be a blessing in one context, as it was during the 1953-54 recession,
but on the growth side it can be a drag. Aooording to Walter Heller:
. . . The vaunted "built-in flexibility" of our tax system,
its automatic stabilizing effect, is a mixed blessing. True, it
oushions recessionism which is good. But left to its own device
it also retards recovery by cutting into the growth of private
inoome, which is bad at least until the production gap is olosed
and inflation threatens.!
In order to point out the importance of the fisoal drag and how
it can retard growth, a second conoept has been introduced—the full
employment budget surplus. This was alluded to in the mathematical
model that solved for tax collections at the full-employment level of
GNP. Paul Samuelson defines the concept as a measure of:
. . . what would be the budget position if the eoonomy were
at full employment (accepted by many as 4 per cent unemployment]
and the legislated tax and spending structures were in effect.
Unless tax rates are cut or expenditures increased, there would
be in every healthily growing eoonomy an inorease in the full-
employment surplus and a resulting fisoal drag. 2
Figure 3-1 depicts the full -employment and actual budget in
graphio relationship. Even though the actual budget graph indicates a
defioit most of the time from 1958 to 1965, the full-employment budget
line shows that there was a surplus in the full -employment budget.
Growth of the economy would have enlarged the full-employment surplus
every year and produced the fisoal drag, if there had not been the
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Pig. 3-1.—Full-employment and Actual Budgets
Source: Paul A. Samuelson, Economics
, p. 345.
The CEA introduced the full -employment budget in their 1964
report,
The economic impact of a given budget program is best measured
by its surplus/deficit at full -employment income levels. The sur-
plus in the full-employment budget is too large when the Government
demand contained in the budget, and private investment and consump-
tion demands forthcoming from after-tax incomes, are insufficient
to bring total output to the full-employment level. . . .
The appropriate size of the surplus or deficit in the full-
employment budget depends on the strength of private demand and
its responsiveness to fiscal policy. The budget must counter-
balance private demand. The weaker the underlying determinants
of private demand, the more expansionary the budget should be;
the stronger these determinants, the more restraining the budget
should be.
Whether a given budget is too expansionary or restrictive
depends also on other Government policies affecting private spend-
ing, of which monetary policy is the most important. Other things
being equal, a strongly expansionary monetary polioy permits a
larger surplus by strengthening business investment, residential
construction, and other expenditures that are sensitive to the
cost and availability of oredit.
•Hj.S., President, Economic Report of the President. 1964
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1964), pp. 39-42.

43
The oonoept of full
-employment budget and fisoal drag, while
being an extremely useful devioe by which to analyze fiscal policy, was
not accepted without its share of Congressional criticisms. A brief
sample of a dialogue between one-time CEA Chairman Gardner Aokley and
one-time Senator and economist Paul Douglas affords ample evidence:
Senator DOUGLAS: How would you define a full -employment deficit
so that you would know whether you had found it or not?
Chairman ACKLEY: For any particular period we calculate what
the fiscal program of the Government would do to the balance
between expenditures and taxes if the economy were operating
at some prescribed level of employment. . . .
DOUGLAS: Well, now this has to be oonducted in a money economy.
ACKLEY: Right.
DOUGLAS: What do you assume on prices?
ACKLEY: The measurement of the full employment surplus or
deficit, would be affected to some extent by changes in prices.
But price changes would involve roughly equivalent expansion
of both the revenue side and the expenditur' side in dollars,
so that--
DOUGLAS: Well, I am not speaking so much of Government finances
as in the private structure outside of Government. Now you say
there is full -employment deficit if the sum total of price tags
on goods exceeds the sum total on goods which either are produced
or could be produced with an unemployment rate of only 4 per cent
as compared with the total monetary purchasing power in the
pockets of oonsumers?
ACKLEY: No, I think the concept of full -employment surplus as
we have it in this paper ....•*-
And the fiscal drag:
DOUGLAS: Now you go to fiscal drag. You say there is a fisoal
drag when there is a full -employment surplus?
ACKLEY: No, we have tried to define the term "fiscal drag"
rather more narrowly. It is defined in terms of the drag on
purchasing power in the eoonomy that results from the normal
•kj.S., Congress, Senate, Joint Economic Committee, Hearings,
Fiscal Policy Issues of the Coming Decade , 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 18,
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growth of Federal revenues that goes along with the growth in
our potential output. If our potential output grows at about
4 per oent, or 3 3/4 per cent as it is currently doing, then
our Federal revenues would rise something like $7 billion a
year. Unless that drag is offset by either tax reduction or by
an equivalent inorease in Government expenditures, there is a
drag on purchasing power, and therefore on the growth of incomes
and production.
DOUGLAS: Just a minute. Let's examine that. Suppose that were
met by debt retirement and that Government bonds held by private
individuals are purchased by the Federal Government. This gives
additional purchasing power to private holders of these bonds,
and they will either reinvest in private enterprise or possibly
spend a little. But why is purchasing power destroyed by that
process?
ACKLEY: It is the surplus of taxes over expenditures that
reduces or destroys purchasing power. The debt retirement
neither creates nor destroys purchasing power. Purchasing power,
unfortunately, is a slippery concept, and perhaps we should try
to avoid using it.
DOUGLAS: Well, my time is up, but when it becomes my time again
I would like to have you go back to this point as to how purchas-
ing power vanishes in thin air if the surplus is used to buy bonds
and releases purchasing power of private individuals. Either you
or I have been saved by the bell, I don't know whioh.^-
If all the theories of new economics rested on sound logic and
rigorous proof, they still lacked the most important criterion of suc-
cess, and that was successful precedent. The American political arena
has never been predisposed to learning its lessons, eoonomio or other-
wise, from the experience of other nations. It took nine months for
the House of Representatives to pass the measure with a vote of 271 to
155. Forty -eight Republicans deserted their party leadership to vote
for tax reduction.
The Senate received the bill from committee hearings in January,
1964, and after a minimum of debate passed the bill, 77 to 21. It is
interesting to note that this roll call almost exactly inverted the last
1Ibid .. p. 21.
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previous Senate vote on tax reduotion as an instrument of fiscal polioy
in June 1958.
The Revenue Aot of 1964 as passed by Congress is slightly dif-
ferent from that vhioh was originally proposed. Due to the delay in
passing, the reduotion in income tax rates were to take place in two
stages—one in 1964 and the other in 1965—rather than over a three -year
period. Altogether, marginal tax rates for individuals were reduced to
a 14 to 70 per cent range vice 14 to 65 per oent, and corporate income
tax liabilities were reduced for most corporations to 48 per cent vice
47 per cent. When originally enacted, the tax out in tax liabilities
amounted to $13 billion at an annual rate, with $10.6 billion accruing
to individuals.
Reduction ir. withholding for individuals—from 18 to 14 per cent
--became effective in March, 1964, insuring that the tax reduction would
have an immediate impact on after-tax incomes and henoe would have a
rapid, and eventually multiple, feedback on spending and output. Because
the withholding rate was out at the outset to reflect both stages of re-
duction, taxes withheld in 1964 left a larger than usual share of total
liabilities to be paid in 1965.
The anticipated effect of the 1964-65 tax out on aggregate
spending was not long in materializing. By the first half of 1965 the
gap between actual and potential GNP had narrowed by more than one -half
from the $25 billion to $30 billion shortfall that had prevailed earlier.1
•Hj.S., Congress, Senate and House of Representatives, Subcommit-
tee on Fisoal Polioy of the Joint Economic Committee, Hearings, Fiscal
Policy of the Coming Decade
. 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 8.
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Gardner Ackley, Chairman of the CBA from 1964-67, speaking
before the Subcommittee on Fiscal Policy of the Joint Economic Commit-
tee, reflected that:
Our strong economio advance through 1964 and the first half
of 1965 reflects the dramatic relaxation of the tax burden on the
economy through the Revenue Act of 1964, with an unprecedented
drop in the full employment surplus shown on Figure 3-2 for early
1964.
Previously in the decade, our periods of declining full-
employment surpluses were confined to the tail end of recession
and the early quarters of reoovery. In both the 1957-58 and
the 1960-61 recessions, the expansionary shift in fiscal policy
occurred only in the final quarter of the recession. Once the
shift was made, fiscal policy contributed actively to the support
of recovery with a drop in the full-employment surplus of over $5
billion during the year 1958 and again during 1961. . . .
Fiscal polioy has helped to maintain overall balance in the
economy in the period since 1960 through the changes in the full-
employment surplus shown in Figure 3-2. The detailed budgetary
changes that produced this result are set forth in Table 3-3.
In the first quarter of 1960, our full employment surplus was $14
billion. If tax rates had been unchanged, full-employment revenues
would have grown by nearly $30 billion from then to the second
quarter of 1965. Had expenditures also remained constant at the
level of the final quarter of I960, the budget would have tightened
steadily, with the full -employment surplus approaching $44 billion
by mid-1965. The consequences for the eoonomy would have been
nothing short of disastrous.
Instead, the Congress and the Administration took expansionary
action totaling nearly $40 billion. We put to excellent social use
the dividend of the $30 billion growth of full-employment revenues,
as well as nearly $10 billion of the full -employment surplus.
Over the period, expenditures grew $27 billion, declining
somewhat as a fraction of GNP. About half of the increase went
into purchases—mainly for defense. Another notable change was
the rise in Federal grants-in-aid to States and localities, from
$6 billion to $11 billion. Tax cuts accounted for about one-third




Fig. 3-2. --Federal Full-Employment Surplus
Source: Joint Economic Committee.
TABLE 3-3
FEDERAL FISCAL ACTIONS, 1960 IV TO 1965 II
$ Billion
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Total expansionary actions 40
Normal revenue growth at full employment ... 30
Change in full employment surplus -10
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Of course, the overall stimulus to eoonomic expansion provided
by tax incentives in this period was not confined to the tax out in
income tax. It also included the very significant lagged effeots of
the investment tax credit and liberalized depreciation allowances
enacted in 1962, as well as an additional liberalization of the invest-
ment tax credit enaoted in 1964 (the Long Amendment) , which eliminated
the 1962 provision that actual tax credits had to be deducted from the
base in computing depreciation.
There was still some concern in early 1965 about the tendency
for actual GNP to fall short of its potential. 1 To help offset this
continuing drag and at the same time make good on a long -deferred promise
to reduce indirect taxes levied in World War II, a multiple staged out
in Federal exoise taxes was enacted in 1965, the Excise Tax Reduction
Act. This provided for a lowering or elimination of excise taxes on
consumer durable goods, telephone service, and certain other items.
The first stage—amounting to a $1.7 billion cut at an annual rate
—became effective in mid-June 1965; the second stage—of an equal
amount—was scheduled to become effective in January 1966; however, this
second stage was virtually eliminated by the Tax Adjustment Act of 1966.
By mid
-1965, just prior to the escalation of fighting in Viet
Nam, the economy had made fairly good progress toward full -employment.
GNP had grown some 13 per cent in the three years from the end of 1962.
While the unemployment rate of 4.5 per cent in 1965 was still above the
target level of 4 per cent, it was a full percentage point below the




quite steady through 1963 and advanced only slightly by 1965. *•
Although the Revenue Act of 1964 is almost universally accepted
as a successful venture into fiscal expansionary policy, it can be
criticized on a legitimate ground; it did not structurally improve the
economy sufficiently to alleviate the poverty of much of the country.
The principal proponent of this view is Leon H. Keyserling, member of
the CEA from 1946 to 1950 and chairman from 1950 to 1953. Speaking at
the Economic Symposium that celebrated the twentieth anniversary of the
Employment Act of 1946, he stated that:
. . . Reoent fiscal policies have shown egregious disregard
for an appropriate blend of aggregate and structural approaches.
The 1966 Report of the Council of Eoonomio Advisors admits at
long last the point I have been making for many years, that the
three recessions since 1953 occurred because during the preceding
upturn periods, investment in the plant and equipment which adds
to our production capabilities was advancing much too rapidly
relative to the expansion of demand for ultimate products in the
form of consumer expenditures and public outlays at all levels of
government. And the Council is now concerned that, during 1964
and 1965, this type of investment advanced more than twice as
rapidly as GNP.
Despite all this, the legislative and administrative tax
reduction of 1962-65, having an annual value of close to $20
billion, directed almost half of this amount to corporate tax
outs and aspects of personal tax reduction designed to increase
the rate of saving for investment purposes. This also served to
limit or restrict policies pointed toward adequate expansion of
private consumption and much-needed public services. . . .
In consequence, at least a third of the tax cut was wasted.
Some went overseas to increase our balance -of -payment problem;
some of it was used for the noneconomio funotion of bidding up
the stock market excessively; some of it was purely saved, or
used to increase consumption among those least entitled to enjoy
these increases, while almost a fifth of our people lived in
poverty.
To be sure, these incontinent tax cuts have stimulated the
economy some; $20 billion a year thrown into the streets would
HJ.S., President, Economic Report of the President, 1968
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1968), pp. 261, 264.
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have done that. But a very different structuring of the tax
cuts, and a very different admixture of reduced taxes and in-
creased public spending, would have provided much more efficient
and immediate stimulus to the economy and been much more con-
ducive to economic equilibrium in the long run. . . .
So the tax cut has not worked wonders. More important still,
the primary purpose of a fiscal policy through the Federal budget
is not to enable us to increase or decrease taxes, depending upon
whether or not we want to speed up or slow down the economy. The
primary purpose is to induce the goods and services which the
nation needs most and cannot otherwise get. This is what the
Federal budget is all about. Largely in consequence of the tax
cuts, the fiscal 1969 budget continues a downward trend in
domestic public outlays measured against the size of our national
product. Some of the social programs which sound more and more
splendid remain only token programs.
^
While Keyserling's argument concerning the correct mixture of
aggregate and structural expansionary fiscal policy is sound, he has
failed to realize the disproportionate effects of increased spending on
Viet Nam that ocourred in late 1965. Prior to that time the expansion-
ary action had taken a two -thirds, one -third division between expendi-
ture increases and tax reduction (see Table 3-3). The upsurge in total
Federal outlays that developed following the escalation of fighting in
Viet Nam, coming as it did at a time when the economy was already moving
toward high employment, tipped the balance of economic pressures toward
inflation. By the spending priorities that developed relevant social
programs of the Great Society were necessarily allotted reduced funds.
After 1965 the success of the Revenue Act of 1964 beoame clouded
with the pressures of inflation. Yet in the relatively short time
period from 1964 to mid-1965, the economy was well on its way toward
full employment with the necessary stability in the price structure.
Yet the fuller use of the nation's resources posed new questions of
U.S., Congress, Senate and House of Representatives, Joint
Economic Committee, Hearings, Twentieth Anniversary of the Employment
Act of 1946, an Economio Symposium, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess., 21-22.
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diagnosis and application. In the early 1960*s the economic and
political risk of fiscal expansion had been minimal because aggregate
demand was insufficient. As the unemployment rate fell toward 4.0 per
cent, the economy entered territory that it had not occupied for nearly
a decade. The risk of excessive demand was real. Stabilization policy
--that of reconciling high employment with reasonable price stability
—was in President Johnson's words, "a welcome task."^- Yet by late
1965 this welcome task was immensely complicated by commitments in Viet
Nam. The smell of war was in the air. The political and economic
pendulum was swinging again from unemployment to inflation.
U.S., President, Economic Report of the President, 1966
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 21.

CHAPTER IV
THB REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE CONTROL ACT OF 1968
Following the major tax cuts of 1964 and 1965 --equivalent
to about $23 billion in today's economy—the booming economy
of 1965 and 1966 brought Federal revenues into balance with
Federal spending. In both years, there was a small Federal
surplus on the comprehensive national income accounts basis.
The slowdown in economic growth that began in late 1966
dampened the growth of revenues. At the same time, the cost
of our commitment to freedom in Southeast Asia was steadily
rising.
As a result, the Federal sector plunged into deficit
—$12.5 billion in calendar year 1967.1
Thus, President Johnson reported that the economy, as close as
it was to full employment in 1967 (3.7 per cent unemployed), was oreating
problems of fisoal management. The "commitment to freedom in Southeast
Asia" was, indeed, a principal oause. From the middle of 1965 to the
end of 1967, the increase in Federal expenditures, as shown in Table 4-1,
was $48 billion. Of this amount some $25 billion was for defense. Of
the $10 billion increase in OASDHI benefits, about $6 billion represented
the decision to provide improved health care for the aged under social
security (medicare) , and the balance represented normal growth in the
ongoing programs. Over the same period, normal growth of Federal revenues
at full employment --at oonstant tax rates—amounted to about $27 billion.
Inasmuch as there were tax rate increases, about $6 billion was added







FEDERAL FISCAL ACTIONS IN TWO PERIODS SINCE FOURTH QUARTER 1960
(Billions of dollars, seasonally adjusted annual rates)
1960 IV to 1965 II to
Item 1965 II 1967 IV
Federal expenditure increases 25.5 48.0
Defense purchases 3.5 25.0
Other purchases ....... 7.5 1.5
OASDHI benefits 5.0 10.0
All other 9.5 11.5
Federal tax reductions 12.5 -6.0
Corporate 5.5
Personal 8.5
OASDHI payroll taxes -3.0 -8.5
Indirect business 1.5 2.5
Total expansionary actions 38.0 42.0
Normal revenue growth at full employment . 30.5 27.0
Change in full employment surplus -7.5 -15.0
Source: Economic Report of the President, 1968
All in all, because of the large rise in defense outlays and the
high priorities for certain public (social) programs, the $48 billion
increase in expenditures far outpaced the normal expansion of revenues
and tax rate increases. As a result, the Federal budget became very
expansionary over the period 1965-1967; the result was a drop of almost







A variety of policy procedures—both fiscal and monetary--was
developed from mid -1965 through 1967 to cope with the increased spending
in the defense budget and the pressures that it brought on the economy.
This task was made difficult by the uncertainties of the Viet Nam con-
flict; the amount of expeoted increases in defense was subject to many
variables—the quest for peace being the prime one. 1
A previously scheduled rise in payroll taxes for social security
of $6 billion took effect at the beginning of 1966. The President's
budgetary program reinforced this restraining action by requesting a
new graduated withholding system on individual income taxes. Also, the
Administration requested that certain excise taxes be reimposed as well
as speeding up the collection of corporate income taxes. These measures
were enacted by the Congress in Maroh, 1966, and thereafter took in $2.5
billion annually from the economy.
Nevertheless, a large part of the burden of providing restraint
fell on monetary policy.** The FED followed a tight monetary policy
which resulted in the "crunch of 1966." The FED raised the discount
rate in late 1965; thus, the volume of non -borrowed reserves and the
rate of growth of the money supply were reduced considerably. The FED,
in retrospect, realized that it had reacted too strongly.
^
As 1966 progressed, it became clear that Federal spending
and borrowing would be much larger than initially projected and
that strong inflationary pressures would persist. To help
counter these pressures, monetary policy was tightened substan-
tially. With demands for funds from private sectors very large






"Monetary Policy in the 1960 's, H Federal Reserve Bulletin
,
September, 1968, p. 714.
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oorporate income tax payments—interest rates rose steeply.
Credit rationing by lending institutions beoarae severe,
particularly in markets for the financing of housing, * and
by the late summer of 1966, these pressures were creating
signs of disorder in financial markets that threatened to
brake the pace of economic activity much too sharply.
Business investment spending, however, proved unresponsive to
the 1966 tight monetary policy. It continued to advance at a rapid rate
during the first and second quarters of 1966. The Council of Economic
Advisors considered that fiscal policy must take more of a role in
restraining the economy:**
The investment boom put severe strain on the plant capacity
and labor supplies of the machinery and construction industries.
There was also danger that an excessive and unsustainable surge
in plant and equipment spending might set the stage for a sub-
sequent slump in investment demand. Finally, the investment
boom added mightily to the pressures on finanoial markets during
the spring and summer of 1966.
The dramatic decline in home building, the highly disturbed
atmosphere of financial markets, and the pressures of business
fixed investment on capital goods industries clearly indicated
that fiscal policy needed to assume a larger share of the
responsibility for restraining the economy.
For these reasons, the Administration in September of 1966
requested a temporary suspension of the investment tax credit and ini-
tiated various cutbacks in Federal spending. At the same time, monetary
policy was relaxed. The suspension of the investment tax credit was
enacted by the Congress in October, 1966. In the first half of 1967,
the investment boom declined somewhat as a result of the investment
credit suspension and the general slowdown of the economy.
•^The annual rate of new housing starts declined from an average
of about 1.5 billion in 1965 to 900 million units in 1966.





Throughout the first half of 1967, Federal fiscal polioy again
exerted an expansionary influence on the sluggish economy. Federal
defense purchases rose $6.9 billion (at an annual rate) between the
fourth quarter of 1966 and the second quarter of 1967. Also, Federal
transfer payments to the private sector rose $3.5 billion. While out-
lays increased, receipts remained about the same due to the decline in
economic activity. The Federal deficit, which had been $3 billion (at
an annual rate) in the fourth quarter of 1966, rose to nearly $15
billion in the second quarter of 1967.
The force of inflation since 1965 can be shown with considerable
clarity by the behavior of the Consumer Price Index (CPI). It rose 2.5
percentage points between June, 1965, and June, 1966; during the next
eighteen months the climb was 2.7 percentage points.** While these
advances were broadly based, they were particularly large for the
service industries. In fact, it is in the service industries that
inflation can most clearly be traced.
Charges for consumer services increased markedly after 1964.
From 1967 to 1968, prices of services increased 5.1 per cent compared





About half of the services represent the output of service
industries where labor oosts are a high proportion of total costs and
where typically productivity gains are limited. Large wage advances in
1967, stimulated by manpower shortages and augmented by the further
boost in February, 1968, of Federal minimum wages (they had been ex-
tended to cover service industries) , have contributed significantly to
the acceleration in service prices.
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Among the "labor intensive" servioes, medical oare—an area of
long standing manpower shortages and rapidly expanding demand—was the
most rapidly rising sector in 1967 and 1968. Costs of these servioes
increased 7.1 per oent from 1967 to 1968. This increase was less than
the 9 per cent increase in 1966 to 1967 when the introduction of the
medicare program caused costs that year to increase rapidly, but the
1967 increase was more than double the 1965 increase.^-
Mortgage interest rates, which advanced sharply in 1966 under
the impact of tight monetary policy, had little net change during 1967;
however, they rose considerably in 1968. During 1968, they rose 6 per
cent as compared with a rise of 3.5 per cent from 1966 to 1968. 2
In general, by almost any standard, prices were relatively
stable prior to the acceleration of military activity in Viet Nam in
1965. Unit labor costs in the second quarter of 1965 were 98.8 per
4
cent of the 1957-59 base. The Viet Nam buildup, however, put strong
demand on heavy industry, and in 1966 prices advanced sharply in defense
industries and the oapital goods sector; the inoreased expenditures
pressed unevenly on capacity and skilled labor. By the end of 1966,
unit labor costs had risen to 102.4—a gain of 3.6 percentage points.
As the economy picked up speed near the end of 1967, prices and
wages again accelerated. The union wage settlements in late 1967 and
U.S., President, Economic Report of the President, 1968
,
p. 279.
2N.I.C.B., Economic Almanac. 1968
. p. 102.
Although the failure of industries with decreasing costs to re-
duce prices during the period is partly responsible for the failure of
price increases in the services to be fully offset by decreases elsewhere,
the period 1961 through mid-1965 was still one of relative price stabil-
ity.
4




early 1968 oaused an even further aggravation in price and wage in-
creases.
The Administration's first request for a surtax on personal and
corporate inoome occurred in early 1967. While the paoe of the economio
expansion was continuing to slow, the Administration proposed that the
Congress enact a temporary 6 per cent surcharge on personal and corpo-
rate income to become effective in July, 1967, and run for two years or
until commitments in Viet Nam tapered off. This request reflected an
assumption that the rate of eoonomic expansion would acoelerate sharply
again after mid-1967 and, thus, would require more fiscal restraint if
inflationary developments were to be checked without risking an overly
abrupt return to credit restraint. With economic activity slowing in
the first half of 1967, the Congress showed little willingness to accept
the Administration's proposal, nor did the Administration press its case
very strongly. In fact, the Administration felt the need to call for a
quiok restoration of the investment tax credit.
By the summer of 1967, however, the economy was showing signs
of overheating. As has already been mentioned, Federal budget receipts
were not increasing correspondingly due to the general slowdown of eco-
nomic activity. With defioit financing expected to reach a new peace-
time high, private borrowers scrambled aggressively to cover, through
anticipatory financing, the bulk of their expected needs. Consequently,
even though monetary policy remained relatively easy, interest rates
rose sharply to levels above the previous World War II peaks that were
also reached in the 1966 period of credit restraint. 1
•'•"Monetary Policy in the 1960's," Federal Reserve Bulletin
,
September, 1968, p. 715.
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Sinoe much of this renewed pressure on credit markets reflected
expectations of developments likely to result from an overly stimulative
fiscal policy, the Administration, in early August, reiterated its re-
quest for the enactment of a surtax. Because it seemed likely that any
final action on the proposal would come well after the July, 1967 effec-
tive date originally proposed, the requested surtax was raised from 6 to
10 per cent.
Accordingly, the Administration's economic "Troika "--Secretary
of the Treasury Fowler, Director of the Budget Schultze, and CEA Chair-
man Aokley—went to Capitol Hill to present their case:-*-
We have concluded that this proposal, supplemented by a
speedup of corporate tax collections and a temporary deferral
of scheduled excise tax deductions, is not only consistent
with the objectives of sustained growth, high employment, and
price stability, but necessary if these objectives are to be
successfully pursued.
The rationale for the surtax was presented by Secretary Fowler
pin the following manner:
1. To hold down the deficit - The Bureau of the Budget, in
revising its expenditure and receipt estimate for fiscal 1968, concluded
that the Federal deficit, without the tax surcharge and tight expendi-
ture control, could range as high as $29 billion—with both tax surcharge
and expenditure control the deficit was estimated to fall within a range
of $14 to $18 billion (actual deficit, fiscal year 1968--$25 billion,
unified budget)
.
2. To meet the special costs associated with Viet Nam - In the
latter part of 1966, it was apparent that the "special" or extra costs
U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Ways and Means, Hearings,
Tax Proposals of the President. 1967
.





of the Viet Nam var in fisoal 1967 would be nearly double those origi-
nally estimated in the January budget. These oosts were estimated to
be in excess of $22 billion.
3. To avoid excessively high interest rates and tight money
- The failure to hold down the budget deficit would create an inflation-
ary environment in which private credit demand would soar, and in which
it would be more difficult to continue an expansionary monetary policy;
this would correspondingly cut down on total available supplies of
credit. Private demands, in the absence of a tax surcharge, would be
expanded in three ways—by the enlargement of Federal credit demands,
by a swelling of private demands themselves, and by the curtailment of
total credit supplies. The net result would be a different set of
credit market conditions, imposing a heavier net demand for funds that
could not be met by institutional lenders, and that oould only be met
in part by the residual sector made up mainly of individuals.
4. To protect healthy economic growth and price stability -
Whenever the eoonomy is operating at close to full use of its productive
resources, a net inorease in government expenditures cannot fail to be
paid for by a slower growth of real income in the private economy.
Extra production necessary to meet the needs of the government must
necessarily be matched by lower production to meet private needs.
5. To protect the balance of payments - The tax increase would
encourage sound, balanced, economic growth and that would be most favor-
able to the balance of payments position. Over the period of 1961-64,
when GNP rose on the average by about 6 per cent annually, the U.S.
trade surplus increased almost $2 billion, from $4.8 billion in 1960
to $6.7 billion in 1964. Without the tax increase, a faster, less
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balanced growth in the eoonomy will ooour. This can lead to a substan-
tial increase in imports. In 1965 and 1966, when GNP rose at an annual
rate of 8 and 9 per oent, imports rose by 15 and 18 per cent, respec-
tively. This was far more than the corresponding increase in exports.
As a result, the trade surplus deteriorated steadily from $6.7 billion
in 1964 to $4.8 billion in 1965, $3.5 billion in 1966, and $3.6 billion
in 1967.
To produce the needed revenue the President's proposal for the
surtax contained three points :*
1. A temporary surcharge of 10 per cent of tax liability (not
10 per cent of taxable income) to be placed on corporations and those
individuals with tax liability above an exemption level (1,000; 1,500;
or 2,000 taxable income, depending on marital and/or household status);
2. A speedup in corporate income tax collections;
3. A postponement of the scheduled excise tax reductions on
automobiles and telephone service during the period of the temporary
surcharge
.
The Administration's case for a tax increase was well supported
by private industry and by business and academic economists. The
Investment Bankers Association, Aluminum Company of America, United
Steel Workers, the Association of American Railroads, and many other
companies and associations joined in support of the tax increase. Also,
a rather impressive petition signed by 455 prominent businessmen who
supported the suroharge was sent to the Ways and Means Committee. A
similar letter signed by 320 academic economists stated the following :**
1Ibid.
f p. 25.
%bid ., p. 631.
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... We are in agreement that
—
given the projected size of
military outlays --cuts in Federal oivilian programs by enough
to avert the need for a tax increase are highly unlikely. Many
of us feel that, even if they were possible, such cuts would be
poor—indeed, dangerous—social policy in the light of the con-
ditions of millions of our citizens living in the ghettoes of
our cities.
We favor a flexible tax policy, which means raising as well
as lowering taxes when needed. ... We urge early enactment of
tax legislation along the general guidelines proposed by the
President.
Regardless of the widespread support for the surcharge—more
unanimous at this stage than was the request for a tax out in 1963—the
proposal was greeted with considerable Congressional opposition. This
opposition persisted in the face of a massive budgetary deficit that
loomed ahead for fiscal year 1968. The "on-again-off -again" experience
with the tax credit suspension had tended to create resistance to fine-
tuning the economy through fiscal action.
An artiole that appeared in the Los Angeles Times by Professor
Harold M. Somers expressed the doubts that many had: 1
. . . Some of the opponents of the [tax]] plan think that
domestic spending should be cut. Others believe the Viet Nam
war should be de-escalated or ended by withdrawal. Many just
don't like taxes.
And a few are afraid that a tax increase of this size will
bring on a depression. They can point to some important indi-
cations that we are not exactly in a state of booming prosperity:
Corporate profits are below last year's figure.
Unemployment is at 3.9 per cent of the labor force, and
is still evidently high enough to provoke riots. . . .
Excess productive capacity is greater than a year ago
in many industries.
The stock market seems to be in doubt as to what to do.
Despite all this, most economio forecasts for the coming year
are favorable. But what if the forecasts are wrong? Should we
take a chance on bringing on a recession through a tax increase?
Harold M. Somers, "Special Comment--The Great Tax Battle—
A
National Inflation 'Trust' Fund," Los Angeles Times , August 17, 1967.
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Somers proposed that instead of a tax inorease the government
should enaot a forced purchase of government bonds. This would ensure
that the extra revenue would be immediately repayable when the economy
strengthened .
*
Congressional opposition within the Ways and Means Committee
centered around the leadership of Chairman Mills. The Committee felt
that exeoutive control of expenditures and greater efficiency in opera-
tion was a necessary quid pro quo for any eventual tax increase. Mills
p
was quoted by the Wall Street Journal as saying:
All of us know only too well that the present budget con-
tains programs that may have lost their justification, and
that we are called upon to approve others and vote sums for
their operation, without having any information about what
their current objectives are and how well they are performing
them or likely to in the future.
As a result of this type of opposition, the Committee voted in
early October to table the President's proposal until such time as an
understanding could be reached between the President and Congress, i.e.,
Mills' Committee, on a means of employing more effective expenditure
reduction and controls as an essential corollary to further considera-
tion of the tax increase. By late November, the Administration was
ready to discuss expenditure control.
The plan oalled for a reduotion in total obligational authority
for the fiscal year 1968 for each civilian department or agency in the
following combined sum:
A two per cent reduction in the January budget estimated for
personal compensation and benefits, plus a 10 per cent reduotion in
1Ibid.
2





suoh estimates for controllable programs other than personal compensa-
tion and benefits.
For the Defense Department, the reduction was to be 10 per cent
of the new obligational authority requested in the January budget,
excluding the special costs of Viet Nam.
These oombined reductions in obligational authority would
produce an expenditure reduction for fiscal year 1968 of $4 billion.^-
Two more reasons for the surcharge were also presented at the
November Hearings. The devaluation of the British pound just a week
prior to the Hearings required prompt measures to protect the dollar
from the vagaries of the international monetary system. The second
reason was due to the fact that Congress had not cut appropriation re-
quests by an amount anticipated by the Administration. In August, the
fiscal 1968 deficit was estimated at $29 billion and only three of the
fourteen appropriation bills for that year had been enacted. New obli-
gational authority was expected to be reduced by Congress in the amount
of $6 billion (covering several years). By late November, with all but
two appropriations enacted, total obligational authority was cut by
only $4.5 billion. This amounted to only $1.5 billion reduction for
fiscal 1968. 2
The passage of time necessitated revision of the original tax
proposal. The updated recommendation called for the 10 per cent sur-
charge on corporate income taxes to be effective from January 1, 1968,
through June, 1969; for personal income taxes (the same low income
U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Ways and Means, Hearings,
Continuation to Receive Further Administration Proposals Concerning






exemptions applied) the suroharge was to be effective from April 1,
1968, through June, 1969. For calendar year 1968, individuals would
pay only 7.5 per cent of their annual tax liability due to the April
effective date. 1
The deadlock between the Administration and Congress concerning
the expenditure cuts was resolved when it beoame evident that the
economy was experiencing renewed inflationary pressures. Under public
demand for some positive action to reverse the unfavorable developments
of the preceding six months, a compromise was reached that involved
both a surtax and a out in spending. In fact, the total fisoal restraint
package that was legislated in June, 1968, was more restrictive than
many had expected.
As finally passed, the Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of
1968 imposed the temporary 10 per cent surcharge on personal and corpo-
rate income taxes and, at the same time, set a ceiling on Federal outlays
for fiscal year 1969. This ceiling was $6 billion below the $186.1 bil-
lion level of outlays that had been projected for this period in the
January, 1968 budget. Certain categories, including Viet Nam related
spending, interest on the debt, veterans affairs, and social security
payments were exempted from the ceiling so that the total of actual
outlays was estimated in January, 1969, to be in excess of $183 billion
on an annual basis. Apart from these specific exemptions, however, the
law reinforced the ceiling on total outlays by providing for cuts of
$10 billion in requested appropriations, requiring gradual reduction in




"Monetary Policy in the 1960's," Federal Reserve Bulletin
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September, 1968, p. 716.
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the number of Federal oivilian employees, and oalling for a recession
of $8 billion in such unobligated balances as remain after June 30,
1969.
In addition, excise tax rates on automobiles and telephone
service were kept unchanged, with the cut previously scheduled for
April, 1968, postponed until January, 1970.
The Aot further accelerated corporate income tax payments by
increasing the 70 per cent estimating requirements to 80 per cent.
Also, in this category, the Aot provides for the gradual elimination
over a ten-year period of the $100,000 exemption on estimated tax
liability for pre -payment purposes.
The economic theory behind the tax cut seemed straightforward
enough to the Administration economists A
. . . The eoonomio effects of a tax increase are the mirror-
image of the expansionary effects accomplished by tax reduction.
A tax cut enacted when there are ample idle resources, as in
1964, has its main expansionary effect on output, with only a
minor impact on prices. Under present circumstances, with
rapidly expanding demands and essentially full employment, the
main restraining impact of the tax increase will be on prices,
and only secondarily on output. . . .
The tax increase works to curb price increases by moderating
the pressures of demand. However, like any other fiscal or
monetary measure, it cannot cope immediately with cost pressures
already built into the system. To be sure, some have argued
that a rise in the corporate profits tax may in fact add to oost
pressures, by inducing firms to raise prices in order to protect
their profits from the impact of the higher tax. But any firm
which was already taking full advantage of its opportunities to
earn profits would have no incentive to raise its prices as a
result of a higher corporate tax rate. The price which results
in the largest profits before taxes yields the largest profits
after taxes, regardless of the tax rate.
The CBA also assumed that wage -earners would not be able to
demand greater wages to compensate for a lower take -home pay; companies





faced with a mellowing market and a large tax bill would not be disposed
to such requests.
The CEA envisioned one more important facet of the surtax—its
impact on long-term stabilization policy. The relative ease in which
the act was passed, oompared to the Revenue Act of 1964, demonstrated
the political feasibility of making fisoal policy work on the unpleasant
side—restraint—when taxes have to be raised rather than lowered. If
the suroharge performed up to its expectations, it would be a culminat-
ing victory for the fiscal activists. It would complete the cycle,
from expansion to stabilization. If successful, there would be little
argument, political or eoonomio, that the "new economies'4 was what they
thought it to be—the only modern way to manage an economy.-*-
By January, 1969, the restraining effects of the surtax were a
source of mild disappointment to the Johnson Administration. To the
oritios of the Administration, it was proof that fiscal stabilization
policy was not the panacea for a booming economy.
The CEA felt that the poor showing of the surtax in 1968 was due
to the late date of its enactment, and because of the fact that much of
the burgeoning growth of the economy was already built into the system
and could not easily be removed.
As a result of the enactment of this fiscal program, the
Federal budget (as measured in the national income accounts)
has shifted from a deficit of $11 billion in fiscal 1968 to one
of only $1 billion (at an annual rate) in the second half of
calendar year 1968. The tax surcharge alone is currently with-
drawing about $10.5 billion (at an annual rate) from the income
stream.
^bid.
"TJ.S., President, Economic Report of the President, 1969
,
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 39.
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The enactment of the surcharge and expenditure cutbacks
immediately strengthened international confidence in the dollar
and caused some relaxation in domestic financial markets. Eco-
nomic activity continued to expand too strongly in the second
half of 1968, but at a less feverish pace than in the first half.
In the last half of 1968, the growth of real GNP was 4.5 per
cent. In current prices, this was a rise of $35 billion (Table 4-2),
TABLE 4-2
CHANGES IN VARIOUS MEASURES FROM THE NATIONAL INCOME
AND PRODUCT ACCOUNTS SINCE SECOND QUARTER 1967
(Billions of dollars, seasonally adjusted annual rates)
Item
1967 II 1967 IV 1968 II
to to to
1967 IV 1968 II 1968 IV
Gross national produot 30.8
Change in business inventories
Final sales
Personal consumption expenditures . .
Business fixed investment
Residential structures
Net exports of goods and services . .




































Source: Economic Report of the President, 1969
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The growth in final sales decelerated, and inventory accumulation,
which fell in the third quarter, ended the year at a rate little dif-
ferent from the high attained in the second quarter.
In the second half of 1968, the advance in GNP was not encour-
aged by the government sector. Federal purchases of goods and services
rose $2 billion and other Federal expenditures increased $3 billion.
At the same time, the surtax was withdrawing over $10 billion from the
private economy. By the fourth quarter, the Federal budget was essen-
tially in balance.
The actions of business fixed investment and Homebuilding in
the second half of 1968 picked up rapidly. Also, consumer expenditures
advanced markedly
—
$18.5 billion between the second and fourth quarters.
This increase was much less than that in the first half of the year.
As a reflection of these indications of continuing expansion,
the unemployment rate dropped to a fifteen year low, 3.4 per oent.
As the CEA looked back on economic activity in 1968, they found
little cause for cheering:**
In retrospect, 1968 is seen as a year of excessively rapid
expansion throughout. Yet, there was a noticeable difference
between the pace of advance in the first half of the year and
that in the second half. The growth rate of real GNP slowed
markedly from 6.5 per oent early in the year to 4 per cent by
year end.
Still, a much more pronounced change of pace in activity was
expected as well as desired. As of midyear, many Government and
private economists expeoted that the advance of GNP in the second
half of the year might be roughly half of the $42 billion gain
for the first two quarters. The enactment of the fiscal program
was one—but only one—of the elements underlying that expecta-
tion. Most of the slowdown was expeoted to result from a lessen-
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In point of fact, several elements of private demand showed
unanticipated strength. The sluggishness of consumer buying in
the early spring months proved to be temporary and misleading.
Business fixed investment began to move up sharply from its
previous plateau. Homebuilding rebounded very strongly and
promptly following the easing of credit conditions. And, the
strength of consumer demand in the summer contributed to a
stepup in production and ordering and subsequently to rising
inventory accumulation. All of these elements taken together
amounted to an unexpected buoyancy in private demand and pro-
duction.
While there is no clear way to tell how much the fiscal
program moderated these forces, it is perfeotly plausible that
in the absence of fiscal restraint there would have been no de-
celeration whatsoever in the second half (unless, of course, the
alternative of severe monetary restraint had been applied)
.
It is too early in the life of the surtax to pass final judgment.
Surely it has not had the impact that the Administration expected. By
all accounts, it was believed that at the beginning of 1969 it would
exert a major impact early in the year.-*- The first quarter developments
indicate that the impact has not been significant. Industrial output
in March, 1969, increased 4.6 from March, 1968. Personal income also
advanced rapidly in February and March of 1969.2
There has been one encouraging indicator in the first quarter
--corporate profits. They posted a strong increase of 7.8 per cent,
but it was considerably less than the 11.1 per cent increase during the
first period of 1968. 3
The economy has in faot resisted the restraining influences of
the surtax; as a result, the Johnson Administration and the new Nixon
Administration have both recommended that it be extended another year.
Nevertheless, whatever lack of sucoess the surtax has had as stabiliza-
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The Johnson Administration has said that the surtax is a
mirror-image of the tax cuts of 1964. If this is true, the question
arises as to why the surtax has not had as much suocess in moderating
the economy as the tax cuts had in expanding it. A partial answer can
be obtained by comparing these two types of fiscal policies.
The surtax is relatively small: The 1964-65 cut amounted to
$11 billion in liabilities
—
$6.7 billion at the beginning of 1964 and
the rest at the beginning of 1965. It was about 2.5 per cent of dis-
posable personal income, while the surtax of $6.9 is only about 1.1 per
cent of disposable personal income for fiscal 1969. * Almost the entire
impact of the 1964-65 tax reduotion was felt in early 1964 when with-
holding rates were cut from 18 per cent to 14 per cent of income. This .
out was so large that tax collections from make-up payments were extremely
high in early 1965. Yet, by then, the economy was expanding briskly so
that consumption continued to expand and the saving rate dropped only
temporarily. In contrast, the surtax has caused large payments in the
first half of 1969 since nothing was withheld for the April to June,
1968 retroactive period of the tax.
The surtax has operated with a lag: In 1964, the tax cut's
stimulus to consumption was relatively prompt, in part because the re-
duction had been anticipated. In 1968, however, much of the impetus in
the economy was so endemic that it could not be immediately removed.
Anticipatory borrowing and spending diluted the immediate effects of
the surtax.
Andrew F. Brimmer, "Monetary Policy and Economio Stability,"
(speech presented to the Tenth Annual Meeting of the National Associa-
tion of Business Economists, September 27, 1968), p. 8.
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The surtax is an upper-income tax: The 1964-65 tax out was
quite helpful to people at the bottom end of the taxable income range.
The new minimum standard deduction reduced drastically the liabilities
of many low-income taxpayers from inoome taxes, and the first bracket
rate was cut sharply. This undoubtedly increased the stimulating
effects of the cut. By contrast, the surtax is most effective at
higher inoome levels where people have more latitude about spending
or saving. Married couples who pay less than $290 of taxes are exempt
and graduated rates apply to those in immediately higher tax brackets.
This is likely to increase the lag—if not the ultimate effectiveness
—of the surtax.
Savings may be cut rather than spending: Because of the recent
high rates of saving, there may be a greater tendency for the tax in-
crease to reduce the rate of saving than would usually be the oase.
However, it is only reasonable to assume that the tax inorease will
reduce the dollar amount of spending much more than it does saving.
Many of the critics of the fiscal program that the Revenue and
Expenditure Control Act of 1968 entails put too much emphasis on the
surtax and too little on the other components of the Act. In partic-
ular, the leveling out of Federal expenditures should be assigned





A comparison of the two revenue acts, although simple enough to
oonstruct, fails to provide a meaningful answer to the problem of
economic stabilization. It is not a question of the failure of an
activist fiscal policy to work; it is primarily a question of how much
unemployment is necessary before inflation is quelled. This is not an
easy question to answer. As has been shown, political fortunes have
been lost with an inappropriate answer and, in a less pragmatic sense,
the economy oan suffer.
At the end of 1968, the rate of unemployment was about 3.4 per
cent, while the rate of inflation was in excess of 4 per cent. This
unemployment rate was considerably below the 4.8 average of 1948-67
and the inflation rate considerably above the 1.7 per cent average for
the same period.
A deoision has to be made concerning the future rate of infla-
tion. One way of putting the choice is to ask whether the objective
should be to maintain the present 4 per cent plus rate of inflation,
to return to the postwar average of approximately 2 per cent, or to
reduce the rate to zero.
There is no doubt that the government can, if so determined,
achieve any of these inflation rates, inc luding zero, on the average
over a period of years. The means are at hand in monetary and fiscal




in turn, controls the prices at which output can be sold and the wages
at which labor can be employed.
The primary question is what the consequences of these choices
would be for the rate of unemployment. While there is much doubt and
controversy about this subject, a few important points seem well
established. There will be an interval during whioh unemployment will
be higher if the inflation rate is reduced to 2 per cent rather than
permitting it to oontinue at 4 per cent, and the unemployment rate will
still be higher if the inflation rate is cut to zero. The difference
between 4 per oent and 2 per oent inflation, in terms of unemployment
during this interval, will be smaller than the difference between 2 per
oent inflation and zero. Also, the difference in the unemployment rates
will be smaller the more gradually the lower rate of inflation is ap-
proached. With the passage of time, the differences in unemployment
rates associated with differences in inflation rates will diminish.
After several years of rapid inflation, from 1965 to 1968, there
is a strong built-in tendency for prices and wages to continue rising
rapidly. Some wages and prices are still catching up with price and
cost increases that oocurred earlier, and some are being raised in the
expectation of more inflation to come. If the rate at which total spend-
ing grows is held down to stem inflation, pressures from businesses and
workers will continue to push up prices and wages and this will curtail
sales, reduce output, and increase unemployment. However, these develop-
ments should, in time, moderate business and labor pressures so that
prices and wages rise less rapidly, thus further discouraging compensa-
tory price and wage demands. If total spending continues to grow
steadily at its new lower rate, the rate of unemployment will diminish.
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Experience with 4 per cent inflation is still fairly new, so
that although price and wage decisions are being made in response to
it and to the expectation that it will continue, these expectations
cannot be solidly entrenched. For example, labor and management have
probably not come to think of 6 per cent annual wage increases as
normal; therefore, it may not take much slack in the economy to re-
adjust wage and price behavior to be compatible with a lower rate of
inflation.
If moving from a 4 per cent rate of inflation to, say, a 2 per
cent rate is economically possible, is it politically feasible? The
answer to that appears to be no. Such a transition would take at
least three to five years, during which the unemployment rate would
increase significantly, perhaps 2 to 3 per cent. Such a move would
involve the concerted efforts of an entire Presidential administration.
The political structure, tied inexorably to high employment, would
react as it has done since 1954--it would remove from office any admin-
istration committed to such a policy.
In view of these political realities, the Revenue and Expendi-
ture Control Act of 1968 will be perhaps as much of a success as the
Revenue Act of 1964. It represents a compromise in the best political
tradition. It will contribute to economic stability without a disrup-
tive effect on unemployment . To be sure, it fails to solve the causes
of inflation and excessive growth, but these are causes with which an
active fiscal policy is ill -prepared to deal. An active fiscal policy
is able to arrest inflationary increases, but it cannot and should not
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